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IN THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARJORIE LOIS ELLMAKER, 
a single woman, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CALVIN TABOR and KEITH TURNER 
and A 1 REAL EST ATE, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company, 
Defendants/Respondents 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
for Canyon County. 
Honorable George A Southworth, District Judge 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho, for Appellant. 
David E. Kerrick I Residing at Caldwell, Idaho, for Respondent. 
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I. 
THE AFFIDAVITS, DEPOSITION TESTIMONY, AND NUMBEROUS ATTACHED 
DOCUMENTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT MARJORIE ELLMAKER'S CLAIMS 
AND CREATE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT. 
A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court failed to follow the legal standards when it granted Calvin Tabor's 
motion for summary judgment. The trial court must construe "disputed facts ... in favor of 
the non-moving party [Marjorie Ellmaker]," and resolve "all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the record ... in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee v. Kootenai 
Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008). A court must deny a summary 
judgment motion if reasonable people might draw conflicting inferences and conclusions 
from the evidence. Pro lndiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding, 131 Idaho 7 41, 7 45 ( 1998); 
Farmers National Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 67-68 (1994). The trial court cannot 
weigh evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. Am. Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 
Idaho 600, 601 (1983). 
8. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence of Her Standing to Withstand 
Summary Judgment and Dismissal. 
Marjorie had legal standing to bring this suit. The trial court determined that it 
would not consider Martha's will as evidence of her devise to Marjorie under I.C. § 15-3-
102. Although admission of the will to show a devise is permissive, the trial court 
reasoned that (1) there was no explanation why it was not probated, and (2) the court 
could not determine that it was Martha's last will. Mr. Tabor adopted the trial court's 
reasoning in his brief. Mr. Tabor's brief addressed the application of I.C. § 15-3-102 and 
I.C. § 15-3-108, but failed to address Marjorie's other standing arguments; therefore, 
she assumes that Mr. Tabor does not contest them. 
Marjorie's October 22, 2013 affidavit stated that Steve Scanlin prepared Martha 
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Martha affirmed that the will stated her intent. Mr. Tabor made no argument suggesting, 
nor produced evidence of, any other will. A reasonable inference, based on Marjorie's 
evidence, and applying the presumptions in favor of her, is that the will, Exhibit B, was 
Martha's only will. 
Mr. Scanlin's law practice focused on elder law including estate planning, wills, 
and probates. Mr. Scanlin assisted (represented) Marjorie as Martha's personal 
representative; he prepared Affidavits of Non-Probate to "transfer [the promissory note -
debt -at issue in this case] to Marjorie. Mr. Scanlin believed those documents effectively 
transferred Martha's property to Marjorie. (The October 22, 2013 affidavits of Marjorie 
and Mr. Scanlin.) It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Scanlin believed a probate was 
unnecessary to transfer Martha's estate. It is a reasonable inference that Marjorie relied 
on her lawyer's judgment, and did not need to probate the will to transfer Martha's 
property. 
The record shows that she met the requirements of the exception to I.C. § 15-3-
102; Marjorie possessed the property according to the will, and no one else had claimed 
it since Martha's death. The record also shows that Marjorie was an heir under 
intestacy. In granting Mr. Tabor's motion for summary judgment, the trial court failed to 
make reasonable inferences in Marjorie's favor and therefore abused its discretion. 
C. Count I -Oral Contract. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence of Mr. 
Tabor's Oral Agreement to Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal. 
Marjorie presented evidence that Mr. Tabor orally agreed that he would repay the 
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debt both before and after it was in default. However, the trial court found that there was 
no consideration for any agreement by Tabor to repay the debt because Marjorie had 
no valid claim against Tabor to forgo. Mr. Tabor argued that as a promiser, he cannot 
be both guarantor and a principal debtor and there was neither consideration nor a 
writing. But, if Mr. Tabor received any benefit because Marjorie delayed bringing an 
action against either him or A 1, then there was consideration. Mickelsen Construction, 
Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 (2013) quoting Vincent v. Larson, 1 Idaho 241, 248 
(1869) ("It would seem that any gain to the promiser, or loss to the promisee, however 
trifling, ought to be sufficient consideration to support an express promise") (emphasis 
added). Mr. Tabor's arguments ignore the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, and his 
oral agreement to pay the loan is an original agreement not governed by the statute of 
frauds. 
The trial court was mistaken when it determined that Marjorie had no valid claim 
to give up, or it was presuming that there was no claim because Marjorie had no 
standing. Marjorie's valid claims against Mr. Tabor, Mr. Turner, A1, or any combination 
of them included: (1) mistake, misrepresentation or fraud, reformation, rescission, or 
unjust enrichment; or at least (2) enforcement of valid agreements between A 1, or all of 
the defendants, and Martha (and later Marjorie). Marjorie could have filed a lien against 
the sold McCall property to the extent of the loan and A 1 's interest in it. Had Marjorie 
filed a lawsuit, then A 1 and the partners' assets would have been negatively affected. 
One of the reasons that she did not file the suit then was because she did not 
understand that Mr. Tabor had misled her and taken advantage of the close personal 
relationship he had developed with Martha and Marjorie. The size of the loan, its terms 
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- including not keeping a security interest in the property until the loan was paid, its 
changing due dates, and that Mr. Tabor knew he could not get a loan like this from a 
bank, are a few of the facts demonstrating the degree of trust that Mr. Tabor developed 
with Martha and Marjorie. By not filing suit earlier because of Mr. Tabor's promises to 
pay, A 1, Mr. Tabor and Mr. Turner gained a "trifling" benefit. This benefit was sufficient 
consideration to Mr. Tabor even assuming the loans were to A 1. 
Mr. Tabor's promises to Marjorie to pay the loan are original promises and an 
exception to the Statute of Frauds. I.C. § 9-506. If the debt was A1's, Mr. Tabor's 
promises to pay it, combined with the consideration that he received from Marjorie are 
covered by I.C. § 9-506(2) & (3). Whether an oral promise constitutes a collateral or an 
original obligation, for the purposes of the statute of frauds, is generally a question for 
the finder of fact. Dalby v. Kennedy, 94 Idaho 72 (1971 ). See also, Wright v. Wright, 97 
Idaho 439 (1976). Marjorie stated under oath, that both before and after the note was in 
default, Mr. Tabor orally agreed that he was responsible for the debt and would pay it. 
Whether Mr. Tabor agreed to pay the debt creates an issue of material fact. For 
these reasons, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on Count I. 
D. Count II - Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient 
Evidence that Mr. Tabor Failed to Act in Good Faith and Fair Dealing to 
Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal. 
Mr. Tabor failed to act in good faith and fairly both before and after entering into 
the loan agreement. The state court ruled that Marjorie's Count II claim that Tabor 
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (covenant of good faith) was 
only based on Tabor's "fraud or undue influence" in the formation of the Note. While that 
was part of Marjorie's claim, the claim was also based on Mr. Tabor's actions as a LLC 
member/manager. 
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After the loan was due, including after A 1 had been administratively dissolved, 
Mr. Tabor represented to Marjorie that he - not A 1 was responsible for and would repay 
the loan. Because of Mr. Tabor's representations, Marjorie delayed her collection action. 
(R., pp. 189, 190.) Because of the delay, the assets of A1 that secured the loan no 
longer existed. "The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant 
implied by law in the parties' contract." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 
Idaho 738, 750 (2000) (other citations omitted). "The covenant requires that the parties 
perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement. ... " Id. If he was not 
responsible for the loan because it was to A 1, then Mr. Tabor was obligated to let 
Marjorie know before he did in the fall of 2009. A person's duty to speak to prevent 
harm to another was raised in James v. Mercea, 152 Idaho 914, 918 (2012)(quoting G 
& M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 521 (1991)). The Court identified that 
this duty arises, 
(1) if there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial 
statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if a fact known 
by one party and not the other is so vital that if the mistake were 
mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the 
fact also knows that the other does not know it. 
If Mr. Tabor was not responsible for the debt, he had a duty to refrain from saying that 
he was. 
As a LLC member/manager, Mr. Tabor also failed to act in good faith good faith 
to repay the loan. Instead, he allowed A1 to loan money for non-business purposes and 
appears to have distributed A 1 assets (that secured the loan), to himself after the loan 
was in default. Marjorie has not claimed that Mr. Tabor is liable for the debt "solely by 
reason of the member acting as a member or manager acting as a manager." Mr. 
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Tabor, a businessman experienced LLC formation and dissolution, was obliged to "wind 
up" A1 affairs once it was administratively dissolved. I.C. § 53-642.1 Once A1 
administratively dissolved, Mr. Tabor could" ... not carry on any [A 1) business except 
that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under section 53-644, 
Idaho Code, and notify claimants under sections 53-648 and 53-649, Idaho Code." I.C. 
§ 53-643B. Winding up required Mr. Tabor to make sure that he used A1's assets to pay 
back A1's creditors - particularly creditors whose loans were secured by A1 assets. I.C. 
§ 53-646. 
Mr. Tabor claimed that they did not wind up A1 because of its debt- implying 
that A 1 did not have assets for its creditors. Mr. Tabor also claimed that he was an A 1 
creditor and that payments to him as a creditor were not included in distributions. There 
are two problems with this argument. First, I.C. § 53-646 sets out the post 
"administrative dissolution" priority of distribution of assets to creditors; it required the 
assets be distributed to creditors like Marjorie. Second, A 1 's tax documents show that 
he took the money as a distribution, not as compensation for services. The tax 
documents appear to show that A 1 had assets that could have been used to repay at 
least part of its debt. Mr. Tabor and Mr. Turner could have made sure that the money 
went to Marjorie in and attempt to fulfill their good faith obligations. Instead they appear 
to have claimed the assets for themselves; and after the dissolution, Mr. Tabor made 
statements assuring Marjorie that he would repay the loan. 
In any event, Marjorie placed sufficient evidence in the record that had the trial 
1 Mr. Tabor's brief cites the newer statute for authority. However, the statute in place 
during the formation and administrative dissolution was the older Title 53, Chapter 6. 
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court made all reasonable inferences in her favor, it would have found issues of fact and 
not granted Mr. Tabor's motion for summary judgment on Count II. 
E. Count Ill - Promissory Note. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence 
that Mr. Tabor was Liable under Agency Doctrines to Withstand Summary 
Judgment and Dismissal. 
The trial court statement of reasons for dismissing Marjorie's Count Ill claim 
show that the court failed to weigh the facts in favor of the non-moving party. The trial 
court stated the promissory note was clearly and unambiguously entered into between 
A 1 Real Estate and Martha and that "there is no evidence that Martha was misled in any 
way." Mr. Tabor adopts the court's statements. The problem with the court's statement 
is found in Marjorie's affidavits that were available to the trial court. In her October 22, 
2013 affidavit, Marjorie stated that Mr. Tabor misled Martha (and Marjorie) and that, 
based on what he told them, they believed the loan was to Mr. Tabor. Her affidavit also 
sets out Mr. Tabor's statements after the loan was made, consistent with her allegation 
that he misled them. Moreover, the trial court appears to have failed to consider the 
potential effects and legal significance of Mr. Tabor's misrepresentations as an agent, 
member, and manager of A 1. 
Mr. Tabor argues that the four corners of the documents show the agreement. 
Marjorie agrees that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Notes are in the name 
of A 1 Real Estate LLC. But points out that there is an ambiguity whether the note is 
secured. The purchase and sale agreement says that the loan is secured by the assets 
of A 1 Real Estate: the note does not mention security: and the closing documents say 
that it is unsecured. Idaho law allows parol evidence in a case where misrepresentation 
is alleged, to show "representations by one party were a material part of the bargain." 
Aspiazu v. Morlimer, 139 Idaho 548 (2003) quoting, Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 
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398,402 (1984). Parol evidence is also admissible in cases alleging "'mutual mistake or 
other matters which render a contract void or voidable."' Gillespie v. Mountain Park 
Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 30 (2002) quoting Mikesell v. Newworld Development 
Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 876 (Ct.App.1992). Therefore, even though Mr. Tabor correctly 
cites the law regarding the usual interpretation of contracts, the impact of an integration 
clause, and the admissibility of parol evidence to interpret a contract, he incorrectly 
applies it to the facts of this case. 
Mr. Tabor was A1's agent and member/manager when he negotiated the loan 
with Martha and Marjorie. The trial court should have considered Mr. Tabor's pre-loan 
statements to Martha and Marjorie about who the loan was to, and his later 
representations to Marjorie that he was responsible to repay the debt as: (1) evidence 
that Mr. Tabor caused Martha and Marjorie to be mistaken about a material term of the 
agreement; (2) consistent with his course of conduct;2 and (3) evidence that he misled 
Martha and Marjorie. Mr. Tabor's representations and omissions were particularly 
influential because of the amount of trust that Martha and Marjorie had in him. Even 
though the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Note show the borrower was A1 
Real Estate LLC, Mr. Tabor has the burden to show that he adequately disclosed A1 
because of his statements to and relationship with Martha and Marjorie. See James v. 
Mercea, Supra. They knew that Mr. Tabor was acting for a principal; but they did not 
know what principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 321 (1957); Keller Lorenz Co. 
v. Insurance Assoc. Corp., 98 Idaho 678 (1977) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency 
2 Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719 (Ct. App.1983) ("fact of agreement may be implied from 
a course of conduct in accordance with its existence and assent.") 
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§ 4(2) (1957), the plaintiff knew the defendant was acting as agent for some principal, 
but did not know which principal); see also, Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70 
(Ct.App.1985). How can Mr. Tabor's listing of A1 as the borrower on a single document 
that he drafted have been an adequate disclosure of its identity, where Martha and 
Marjorie could not distinguish between the two entities (Mr. Tabor and A1), when they 
did not know, of, or the significance of, limited liability companies? 
Marjorie put facts in the record that showed Mr. Tabor failed to make sure that 
they knew the significance of dealing with A 1. To them, A 1 was just a name for Mr. 
Tabor and his partner's business; it was not a separate principal (entity). Therefore 
under agency principles, Mr. Tabor is personally liable on the note even if it is in A 1 's 
name. 
F. Count IV - Unjust Enrichment. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient 
Evidence that Mr. Tabor Received a Benefit and is Liable under Unjust 
Enrichment Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal. 
Calvin Tabor was enriched in two ways when he received and failed to repay the 
loan from Martha Chitwood. First, his business, A 1, was able to use the $150,000.00 for 
its benefit. Secondly, he took distributions in cash and other assets from A 1 after he 
obtained the loan. The trial court appears to have ruled that Mr. Tabor did not receive a 
benefit because A 1 dissolved due to being insolvent. But, the elements of unjust 
enrichment do not only apply if A 1 was solvent at the time that it was administratively 
dissolved. Mr. Tabor argues that Marjorie's Count IV claim is outside of the statute of 
limitations for bringing an action against him involving distributions of A 1 's assets to him 
according to I.C. § 30-6-406, Liability for Improper Distributions. Mr. Tabor misapplies 
the statute. 
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Mr. Tabor argued that Marjorie's unjust enrichment claim is time barred. 
However, the statute that he relied on was not in place at the time of the distribution. 
But, even if the statute applies to the time period and distribution, it does not apply in 
this case. The statute appears in Title 30, Chapter 6, Part 4; this part governs the 
"Relations of Members to Each Other and to Limited Liability Company." It applies to an 
action by a member or the company, against another member, not to an action by a 
third party against a member. In this case, the statute would apply between Mr. Tabor 
and Mr. Turner. For example, Mr. Tabor could bring a claim against Mr. Turner under 
this section if A 1 was unable to pay back its loan to Martha when it became due in 
December 2007, because Mr. Turner had taken distributions in violation of I.C. § 30-6-
405 and 30-6-409. That is not the case here. Neither Martha nor Marjorie were 
members of A 1 so the statute's time limits to bring a suit do not apply. Presumably, the 
time limit applies against members, because as company insiders they are in a position 
to know quickly whether (1) distributions have been made, and (2) whether the LLC is 
unable to pay its debts as they become due. An outsider would not necessarily have 
that information. Finally, it seems incongruent that a member who wrongfully took a 
distribution, could defeat a creditor's claim by claiming it is time barred under this 
statute, where I.C. § 30-6-704 "Other Claims Against Dissolved Limited Liability 
Company" establishes a five (5) year limitation on actions for claimant against a 
member who received distributed assets after dissolution. A 1 could have resolved any 
of its creditors' claims by filing an article of dissolution and notifying its creditors of the 
dissolution. 
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Marjorie put facts before the trial court that demonstrated Mr. Tabor received a 
benefit under, at best for him, questionable circumstances; no doubt, he appreciated the 
benefit when he took a distribution after the loan was in default. Mr. Tabor does not 
claim that he did not receive a benefit from the loan. And, based on the circumstances 
alleged and placed before the court in Marjorie's affidavits, the evidence demonstrates 
that it would be unjust for him to retain the benefit without paying back the loan. The trial 
court erred by failing to construe the evidence in favor of Marjorie and by finding that 
there were no issues of fact as to Count 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Marjorie L. Ellmaker respectfully asks the Court to 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Calvin Tabor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~y of September, 2014 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES That a true and correct copy of the 
above was hand delivered to: 
David E. Kerrick 
Attorney for Respondent 
1001 Blaine St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
DATED: September 15, 2014. 
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